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Fact-Finding and Opinion Writing for
Administrative Law Judges
Panel Presenters
The Honorable Jean F. Greene
Federal Administrative Law Judge for the United States Environmental Protection
Agency and Chairman of the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges of
the American Bar Association.
William Keppel
Attorney-at-Law, Dorsey & Whitney.
Marcia Gelpe
Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, and member of the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency.
The Honorable Jean F. Greene
I look around and see very experienced judges before me. I
will do my best to be informative and amusing on the subject of
findings of fact. My comments will focus on the question of what
constitutes the findings of fact and the related issue of how de-
tailed the findings of fact should be.
The findings of fact should be organized, concise, clear, and
well-reasoned. A finding should not include absolutely everything
in the record. It ought to consist of a set of basic facts that are
needed in order to springboard to the conclusions of law. As an
example of what I am talking about-or rather, what I am not
talking about-let us look at a case decided under the Hazardous
Materials Control Act. This Act regulates polychlorinated biphe-
nyls, or PCBs. As of January 1, 1980, the Act requires all electri-
cal equipment containing PCBs to be labeled with a sign that reads
"Danger: PCBs."
On January 5, 1980, five days after the deadline, two inspec-
tors from the United States Air, Water, and Soil Protection
Agency, which has jurisdiction to enforce this Act, arrived at the
Bear Paw Corporation to inspect the premises. Bear Paw Corpora-
tion is in the business of rehabilitating or rebuilding transformers.
Bear Paw purchases them from such places as electric power
plants. Some of the transformers are rebuilt; others that are be-
yond help are stored and eventually discarded.
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When the inspectors arrived on January 5, they saw the fol-
lowing. One hundred transformers were lined up in the defend-
ant's backyard outside its rehabilitation premises. Only ten of the
transformers had labels of any kind on them. The first five trans-
former labels read "Danger." The second five read only "Caution:
PCBs." None of the transformers were labeled with what the reg-
ulation required-"Danger: PCBs."
One of my colleagues made the following findings with re-
spect to this situation.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
On or about January 5, 1980, Mr. John Jones and Mr.
James Smith of the United States Air, Water, and Soil Protec-
tion Agency arrived at the respondent Bear Paw Corporation's
place of business, which is located at Four Rabbit's Foot Road,
Waterside, Illinois 10011, in order to conduct an inspection on
that facility which they were authorized to do by law.
The day was clear and neither Mr. Jones nor Mr. Smith
had any difficulty in inspecting the respondent's facility.
There were nine employees of the respondent present at the
facility on the day of the inspection.
Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith talked at length with Mr. Sa-
muel Strong, who had been the manager of the facility since
June 5, 1975. Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith showed Mr. Strong
their United States Government identification and told Mr.
Strong why they were there. He agreed to show them around,
having evidenced a clear understanding of their purpose in be-
ing there.
Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones counted 100 transformers on
the facility. Of these 100, some 90 transformers did not appear
to have labels. At least after careful examination of all of the
transformers, they could not find labels on 90 of them. Mr.
Smith and Mr. Jones found the label "Danger" on five of the
tranformers. Another five, which were located immediately
outside the doorway on the northeast corner of the shop, had
labels on them which said "Caution: PCBs."
In talking with Mr. Strong, Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones
learned that the company had ordered labels for all the trans-
formers on December 5, 1979, in anticipation of the deadline
on January 1, 1980, but only these ten labels had arrived. He
and Mr. Thomas Tough, the assistant plant manager, had in-
stalled the ten labels on the ten transformers that were stand-
ing closest to the doorway. They chose to label these
transformers because it had snowed just before the labels ar-
rived, and they did not care to venture further into the yard.
It was easiest to label the ten closest to the door. Mr. Smith
and Mr. Jones explained to Mr. Strong and Mr. Tough, who
had come in just after the inspection had begun, that the labels
on the transformers did not say what the regulation required,
i.e., "Danger: PCBs."
I have concluded that, as a matter of law, the five trans-
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formers standing by the northeast doorway of the respondent
were labeled "Caution: PCBs," but were not labeled as they
were required to be labeled by the regulation. I conclude that
the respondent was in violation of the regulation. With re-
spect to these transformers the respondent must pay a civil
penalty in an amount to be discussed in a subsequent
paragraph.
As for the 90 transformers that were apparently not la-
beled at all, I conclude that those transformers were in viola-
tion of the regulation.
The approach illustrated above is very different from the one
I would have taken. My rewritten version of these findings is as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
On January 5, 1980 the respondent had on its premises
100 transformers, none of which were labeled as required by
law.
Respondent Bear Paw Corporation is in violation of the
law.
No other facts have to be found with respect to this situation ex-
cept those two sentences.
In my colleague's findings of fact, all sorts of things were
said, but much of the detail was unnecessary. If a judge is going to
make all these findings, she has made no findings. Opinions which
contain extraneous material are not helpful to the reviewing au-
thority or anyone else attempting to understand the basis for the
decision. Now I caution judges that if they omit this material as I
do, any number of people will criticize them for not being very
good judges because they did not write very much, and surely
there must have been a lot more to say about the case. Indeed, in
my own office I am criticized for not writing enough. In examin-
ing my findings, however, I cannot find anything else that is really
necessary.
Expert testimony should be used with caution. I am very
careful to include in the findings only that portion of the expert's
testimony that is in her field of expertise. For example, an expert
has testified about air pollution. I do not include in the findings
the expert's testimony concerning the amount of smog in the air if
the expert did not do her own calculations.
My philosophy is similar in the area of opinion writing.
Seven pages is sufficient to convey a decision unless it is a major
case. By major case I mean a proceeding with four or five hundred
defendants and complicated law. My philosophy is to be very
brief. I start with a statement describing the nature of the pro-
ceeding. Next I describe the status of the case. I will then state
1986]
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what the parties contend and give my conclusion. I discuss only
the evidence I find persuasive, not the whole record or everyone's
testimony.
During my ten years as a judge, I have written only one opin-
ion that exceeded eleven pages and only two opinions that ex-
ceeded seven pages. These cases involved fairly difficult technical
material. My colleagues will write lengthy opinions-thirty, forty,
and even fifty pages-which include facts, findings, and conclu-
sions that I would have written in a few pages. Opinions that are
too long waste time, facilities, secretaries, and other resources.
I believe it is polite, when a very large record exists, to recite
briefly why the principal evidence the losing party cited to support
her case is not relied upon. Also, I recite what I find particularly
persuasive and sometimes what I find particularly not persuasive.
I assume it will be understood that I do not rely on evidence which
is not mentioned in the opinion.
The previous example demonstrates that my findings are
very brief. I do not combine my reasons and my findings. I like
the notion of having very sparse but right-to-the-point findings
that leapfrog to the conclusions of law.
William Keppel
Being one of the non-judges here, it gives me great pleasure
to say, "I dissent." I dissent in part with what Judge Greene told
you about findings. I have been involved in adjudicatory hearings
where the administrative law judge's decision was over 100 pages.
In one case, the hearing involved a $1.5 billion pipeline and, in an-
other case, a more than $1 billion power plant.
These hearings covered issues of the greatest complexity. For
example, the hearing in the power plant case took five months-
four days a week starting at 8:30 in the morning and running until
5:30 at night with an hour off for lunch.
I do not quarrel with the basic premise that findings should
be concise. In appropriate cases, however, findings should be quite
detailed because of the complexity of the issues, the nature of the
subject matter of the proceeding, and the amount of money in-
volved-in other words, where there is a high potential that the
case is going to get into court.
The power plant case was before the Minnesota Supreme
Court only months after it was decided by the agency., In those
cases, a prudent administrative law judge would make, and a pru-
1. Kilowatt Org. v. Department of Energy, 336 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 1983).
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dent counsel would urge the judge to make, some fairly detailed
findings of fact to make it easier for the reviewing court to under-
stand the basis for the decision on each material issue. An opinion
may actually head off review proceedings if it is well written and
detailed.
I also do not agree with Judge Greene's example concerning
the transformers. Certain circumstances raised by the scenario
may well have merited her colleague's detailed discussion. For ex-
ample, there was a finding that Mr. Smith showed the inspector
around the plant. If Smith's consent to the agency's inspection is
an issue, and if I were the agency's attorney, I would want a find-
ing that Mr. Smith showed the inspector around the plant. Simi-
larly, if substantial compliance with the regulation is a defense, I
would want a specific finding regarding the ten inadequately la-
beled transformers. If I were the attorney for Mr. Smith, I could
argue that "Caution: PCBs" means the same thing to a reasonable
person as "Danger: PCBs." While the agency may not accept that
argument, a reviewing court surely may.
What I am saying is that findings should be made on all rele-
vant issues that ultimately may come before the agency or a re-
viewing court. These issues include not only those necessary to
decide whether the essential elements of a violation or claim have
been proven, but also those related to any anticipated defenses. To
some extent, you must ask yourself, who am I writing for? You
are not writing only for yourself or even for the agency. You are
writing for the parties, you are writing for the reviewing courts,
and, to some extent, you are writing for posterity. You should
take into account the audience and, of course, the nature of the is-
sues. If the issue is simply what the labels said, then I do not quar-
rel with Judge Greene. If consent or substantial compliance or
other defenses may be at issue, however, then findings should in-
clude statements of fact which will help the agency resolve these
issues and will permit a reviewing court to understand what the
agency did and why.
Part of our differences may also lie in that Judge Greene is
talking about a two-part decision: one document entitled "Find-
ings, Conclusion and Recommended Decision," and then a separate
opinion explaining why certain issues were decided the way they
were. Local practice is quite different in this respect. Typically, I
see decisions reflected in a single document without a separate
opinion. The explanation of the decision which Judge Greene re-
ferred to would be incorporated in the findings and conclusions (or
would generally not be provided).
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The essential question before us is, how much detail is re-
quired? The cases and the various administrative procedure acts
show that a regurgitation of the evidence is not expected or de-
sired. I agree with Judge Greene that a judge does not have to re-
count the testimony. Nevertheless, some level of fact-that is,
something short of the ultimate facts of the case (which in my
mind are closer to conclusions of law)-must be stated. They are
not raw facts or testimony. They are facts, however, of a basic and
underlying nature that support the ultimate factual findings which
are usually stated in the language of the statute or rule.
It is also prudent to cite to the hearing record where a factual
dispute exists so that the facts that support your findings are ap-
parent. If you are going to do the work to review the record, I do
not see why you would not support your factual findings, where
underlying facts are hotly disputed, to citations in the exhibits or
in the testimony. Pride in one's work product and the desire not
to be reversed would dictate that decisions be bolstered as much as
possible.
Perhaps the best way of determining how much detail is re-
quired is to look at the purposes the findings serve. In other
words, the amount of detail required is that which is sufficient to
satisfy the reasons for requiring findings. There are at least five
such purposes. First, the reviewing court must be able to under-
stand what the basis of the decision is and why it is so decided.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a reviewing
court must judge the propriety of the administrative action solely
on the grounds invoked by the agency in its findings, conclusions,
and decision.2 The court should not be filling gaps or substituting
reasons if the agency has failed to do an adequate job in drafting
its decision. Consequently, some detail is required for a court to
understand what the agency has done and the basis for the
decision.
A second reason for a degree of detail is to prevent courts
from usurping administrative authority. If the findings and con-
clusions are inadequate, reviewing courts will be tempted to fill in
the gaps as they would like them filled in. If you only provide a
bare bones decision, you might find the courts supplying the basis
for a different decision, and that is undesirable. The appropriate
division of authority between courts and agencies would be better
maintained if administrative law judges and agencies explained
their decisions more fully.
A third reason for findings is to ensure careful decision mak-
2. Securities Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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ing. It is my belief that by requiring an explanation of the basis
and the justification for the decision, we are going to get higher
quality decisions. When you have to substantiate your decision
with detailed findings on each material issue, a justifiable and just
decision will result. You may well find the decision should be dif-
ferent than you initially thought.
A fourth reason is to advise the parties as to the outcome of
the case and why they won or lost, even though a bottom line or
bare bones decision would have met the statutory or legal stan-
dards. Notions of fundamental fairness require that the basis for a
decision be announced to the parties who may be adversely af-
fected by it so that they do not have to guess. A well-drafted deci-
sion also aids the party who lost in deciding whether the next step
of review is desirable. You will actually minimize the likelihood of
judicial review (and of reversal) by a well-drafted and detailed
decision.
Finally, detailed findings keep administrative agencies within
their own jurisdiction. The ability of an agency to expand its juris-
diction will be reduced if it must provide written justification of
each material finding in light of applicable statutory or regulatory
guidelines.
If you look at why we have findings in the first place, some
detail-even beyond the minimum which is legally required-is
prudent. It also promotes an aura of fairness. I certainly urge the
inclusion of detailed findings upon judges in cases that I am in-
volved in because if I win, favorable detailed findings make the
chance of reversal on appeal less likely. So I tend to encourage
overwriting, figuring that the courts can sift out any chaff. Given
the heavy workloads of most administrative law judges and their
lack of support staff, I believe that I will better serve my client's
interest by doing as much work for the judge as possible. Thus, I
draft detailed proposed findings which are cited to the record. If I
am successful, a favorable detailed decision is easier to defend in
the courts. That helps the judge and that helps me and my client.
Marcia Gelpe*
It is a cardinal rule of any type of writing that you should
write for your audience. Lawyers recognize this when they write
opinion letters to clients or briefs for courts. These two types of
documents are written differently. Similarly, judges in the state
* The opinions in this article are those of Professor Gelpe and not those of
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. A version of this article was published in
Minn. State Bar Ass'n. Ad. L. News, February 1986, at 1.
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and federal courts understand that they are writing for the attor-
neys in the case and for attorneys in future cases. Administrative
law judges write for the parties and for eventual court review, but
they write mainly for an agency.
In most administrative law schemes, the decision of an ad-
ministrative law judge in either an adjudication or a rule-making
proceeding is to be referred to the agency responsible for the ulti-
mate decision. While the agency is to give serious consideration to
the administrative law judge's opinion, and in some cases very sub-
stantial deference to it, the ultimate decision rests in the hands of
the agency. This is because the agency has certain responsibilities
that the administrative law judge does not have. For example, in
rule making it is the agency, not the administrative law judge, that
is properly responsible for incorporating political factors into the
decision. In adjudications, it is the agency, more than the adminis-
trative law judge, that sees all agency decisions and is responsible
for consistency in the adjudicatory opinions over time.
Here are six guiding rules for what an administrative law
judge's report should contain.
1. Statement of the issues. The report should state sepa-
rately each issue that is being decided. Separation of issues is cru-
cial if the next two recommendations are to be followed. In
addition, a separate statement of each issue helps the administra-
tive law judge and the agency officials to structure their opinions.
2. Characterization of each issue. Issues may be factual,
legal, policy, or a mixture of two or all three. Agencies treat each
type of issue differently. Thus, characterization of the issues in
the report will help the agency.
The final administrative decision maker should accord
greater deference to the report of the administrative law judge on
factual issues than on policy issues. While the administrative law
judge has expertise in factual determinations and operates in a sit-
uation well suited to determining the facts accurately, the final
agency decision maker has both the political responsibility and the
best access to information on the values of affected constituencies
to make policy choices. In some cases, an agency may decide to ac-
cord great deference to the administrative law judge on legal is-
sues, based on the value of having a neutral lawyer address such
issues. On the other hand, the agency may sometimes prefer to
rely on the expertise of its own legal counsel, particularly when
the issue involves interpretation of the agency's own legal
authority.
This can be illustrated by an example. In the environmental
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area, a perpetual problem for regulatory agencies is distinguishing
fact problems from policy problems. When a permit is issued for a
garbage-burning power plant, one of the issues is the appropriate
limit on emissions of toxic air pollutants. These emissions are not
subject generally to set numerical standards. The question is
whether the agency should limit these emissions and, if so, how
stringently. There are four sub-issues. First, what harm do the
toxic emissions cause? Second, what is the cost of the proposed
level of control? Third, what level of control should be imposed to
prevent the identified harm? This is not the end of the problem
because, to a significant extent, no one has obtained or can obtain
firm data on the harm of some pollutants. When the harm is un-
certain a fourth issue faces the agency: what level of control
should be imposed to prevent the possibility of harm from toxic
emissions. There is a tendency to confuse these issues, that is, to
phrase the question of what to do in the face of uncertainty as a
question of whether harm has been proved or whether the proven
harm justifies the control costs. A report by an administrative law
judge that identifies and decides the issues as separate is most
helpful to the agency.
3. Role of the administrative law judge on each issue. The
administrative law judge's role in determining whether a specific
fact has been shown is different from her role in determining
whether the agency has made a reasonable policy choice. The ad-
ministrative law judge's conception of her role is most likely to be
unclear on policy choices. The administrative law judge may de-
termine the agency made an impermissible policy choice, or the
agency made a policy choice the judge views as unwise. The
agency is entitled to treat these two decisions differently, so the
administrative law judge must clearly state which type of decision
is involved.
For example, in a rule-making proceeding for controversial
rules in Minnesota, the administrative law judge must determine
whether the agency has shown a need for the rule and that the
rule is reasonable. 3 The determination of need will involve some
factual issues. When considering factual issues, the administrative
law judge's role is to see that the evidence bears out the agency's
findings. On questions of policy, the administrative law judge has
a more limited role: to determine whether the agency's policy was
reasonable or unreasonable. This is not the same as deciding
whether the policy is the best choice. In most cases, there is a
range of reasonable choices. If an administrative law judge deter-
3. Minn. Stat. §§ 14.131, 14.14(2), 14.15(4)(1984 & Supp. 1986).
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mines that the agency's policy choice is impermissible, the final
agency decision maker must decide whether to go along with the
administrative law judge's determination. The question for the
agency is whether the administrative law judge held the agency's
proposed choice impermissible because it was not reasonable or
simply because the judge thought some other policy would be bet-
ter. If it is the former, the agency is more likely to go along with
the administrative law judge's position than in the latter case. Of
course, even in the latter case, the agency decision maker may be
convinced that the administrative law judge's policy choice should
be adopted by the agency.
4. Reasons. It is very important that the opinion state the
reasons for specific findings. The reasons may determine whether
the agency decision maker accepts or rejects the findings.
Assume the issue in a rule-making proceeding on acid rain is
the amount of acid in a lake that will kill certain fish. The agency
may propose an acid level of four. Different testimony at the hear-
ing before the administrative law judge might indicate that an acid
level of three, five, or six kills fish. The report may set out the
testimony and find that the appropriate level is five. In reaction,
the agency staff says that the administrative law judge is wrong
and that the best choice was four. The final agency decision maker
must decide whether to agree with the report, with the staff, or to
choose another number.
The immediate question is why the administrative law judge
made the finding that an acid level of five kills fish. For example,
the administrative law judge might have found that the quality of
the testimony of the expert who said the appropriate level was five
was better than the quality of the testimony of the others. The ad-
ministrative law judge might have thought that expert seemed
most confident, least shakeable, and most professional. In that
case, the agency should agree with the report unless the staff gives
specific reasons for disagreeing. Alternatively, the administrative
law judge might have found that the expert whose testimony indi-
cated the appropriate level is five had the best credentials. In that
situation, the final agency decision maker is more likely to recon-
sider the issue than in the prior case. Credentials are a matter of
paper record and agency personnel can review them as well as the
administrative law judge can. As a third example, the administra-
tive law judge might have found the testimony was conflicting and
selected an average of the alternatives.4 In that case, the agency
4. See, e.g., Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n, 42
N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1983) (the court approved a Minnesota Public Utilities Conmmis-
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would be most likely to take a fresh look at the issue. The
agency's ability to pick a number out of the middle is as strong as
that of the administrative law judge.
When the administrative law judge is looking at the reason-
ableness of a proposed rule, it is also important for the report to
give specific reasons. For example, the report should specify
whether the agency's proposed rule was found unreasonable be-
cause the agency's argument was circular, because the agency ig-
nored a number of important factors, or because the agency could
have taken a better path.
5. Recommendations on policy choices. The prior recom-
mendations should not be read as suggesting that the administra-
tive law judge give no independent opinions. An administrative
law judge may think the path recommended by the agency is per-
missible (reasonable) but wrong. The report should state this.
The administrative law judge should not strike down the proposed
rule, but should state in the report that the rule is permissible but
that it would be better to do something else. Again, this should be
supported by reasons. An agency decision maker should value the
independence and fresh look that an administrative law judge
brings to an issue. While the administrative law judge's view is not
legally binding, it may be influential.
6. Specificity in findings and conclusions. It is much easier
to read and pay close attention to a report that is specific and brief.
The more specific the opinion, the more precisely the agency can
react. Findings of fact should not include restatements of the evi-
dence. Any discussion of evidence should be in a discussion sec-
tion. The report should include references to the record where it
is important. It will help agency personnel find their way around
a complex record.
If administrative law judges follow these recommendations,
they will make the jobs of agency decision makers easier. They
will also probably improve the quality of the ultimate decision.
sion finding that the agency reached by "taking a weighted average" of two
recommendations).
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